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1 Introduction
Researchers and practitioners struggle to predict stock prices since decades. Besides fun-
damental and technical measures, investor sentiment indicators are increasingly impor-
tant. Researchers try to precisely measure consumer sentiment (see Dominitz and Manski
(2004)), sentiment measures are widely discussed in the media (see, for example, Abeter
(2006) in the BusinessWeek), and stock exchanges provide sentiment measures on their
home pages (see, for example, the home page of Deutsche Bo¨rse Group1). Furthermore,
sentiment measures are used in practice as fund managers claim to base their decisions
(among other things) on sentiment measures. Are investor sentiment measures useful to
predict the market? There is huge empirical literature, that analyzes the mutual influ-
ence between stock returns and investor sentiment measures. Empirical studies differ in
various dimensions. Most importantly, studies usually differ in the way they measure in-
vestor sentiment. This might be one reason why the evidence concerning the forecasting
ability of sentiment is mixed and sentiment measures based on different data sources (e.g.
questionnaires, stock transactions) yield different results. Thus, sentiment measures seem
to be somehow useless in practice, in part because of the obvious weaknesses of existing
measures. Our goal is to propose another sentiment measure that, ex ante, should be a
better measure of investor sentiment as it circumvents some of the obvious weaknesses of
the other measures mentioned above. We show that this new measure is indeed able to
predict what is going on tomorrow: When individual investors are optimistic today, stock
prices are going up tomorrow. However, predictive power is low and even our sentiment
measure is not able to predict the future over longer horizons. As our conclusion, we argue
that sentiment measures nicely capture what a specific group of investors thinks and does,
but these measures are useless for asset management in practice.
1See http://boerse-frankfurt.com/pip/dispatch/en/pip/private investors/aktuelles/marktsentiment (21.03.2007).
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Our sentiment measure is designed as follows. Due to a unique transaction data set, we
are able to propose a measure of investor sentiment that is based on the individual hold-
ings of bank-issued warrants by private investors who are customers of a large German
online broker. We compare the number of investors who hold call warrants (positive ex-
pectations about the future price of the underlying) to investors who hold put warrants
(negative expectations) on an individual level and on a daily basis. This way of measur-
ing sentiment circumvents the main drawbacks of existing measures. Individual investor
sentiment measures based on stock transactions (such as in Kumar and Lee (2006)) face
the problem that, due to short sale constraints, it is harder to express negative sentiment
for a stock through a sale compared to expressing positive sentiment through a purchase.
The decision to sell a stock that one holds in his portfolio already can have several rea-
sons apart from the expectation that the respective stock price will decline in the future.
Examples include the demand for liquidity, portfolio rebalancing, or the (irrational) re-
luctance to sell stocks with a loss. In contrast, the purchase of a put warrant is a clear
sign that investors expect falling prices of the underlying.2 In addition, it is difficult to
calculate individual investor sentiment measures based on aggregate transaction data, for
example from the option market (such as in Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006)), since
it is impossible to disentangle individual investors’ transactions from the transactions of
other investor groups, such as institutional investors. Survey based sentiment measures
that are analyzed for example in Solt and Statman (1988), Shiller (2000), or Brown and
Cliff (2005) are confronted with the problem that investors might act differently in the
market, where real money is at stake, as compared to questionnaire answers. Furthermore,
Glaser, Langer, Reynders, and Weber (2007) show that stock return expectations, which
are the basis for these studies, are easily influenced by the specific elicitation mode used in
2An obvious counterargument to this revelation of negative expectations could be that another motive for holding a
put warrant might be hedging. There are several points that make it unlikely that hedging is the main focus of individual
investors in the warrant market. A further discussion on this topic is provided in Section 4.3.
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questionnaire studies (i.e. whether forecasters have to state future price levels or directly
future returns). We argue that our sentiment measure simultaneously avoids the problems
mentioned above.
After the construction of our measure, we then test whether individual investor sentiment
is related to daily stock returns by using vector autoregressive models and Granger causal-
ity tests and find that there exists a mutual influence between sentiment and stock market
returns in the very short-run (one to two trading days). Returns have a negative influ-
ence on individual investor sentiment, which in turn influences the return of the following
day positively. This means that private warrant investors trade on negative feedback and
that their expectations about the underlyings are correct in the short-run. The impact of
stock market returns on sentiment is stronger than vice versa. We find no evidence for
stronger influence of sentiment on small stock returns than big stock returns as it was
suggested by different authors.3 The sentiment, derived from German private investors,
is a predictor for next days stock market returns in Germany but (unsurprisingly) not
in the US, although both German and US stock returns influence the sentiment of the
German investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start with a description
of the institutional characteristics of bank-issued warrants in Germany. In Section 3, the
data set and the methodology are described. Empirical results are reported and discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3See e.g. Kumar and Lee (2006) and Neal and Wheatley (1998).
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2 Institutional Characteristics of Bank-issued Warrants
Bank-issued warrants4 (warrants hereafter) securitize the right, but not the obligation,
to buy (call) or sell (put) a certain amount of the underlying security for a previously
specified price up to (American-style warrant) or on (European-style warrant) a previously
specified maturity date. The payoff structure of those warrants is the same as for plain-
vanilla options, although warrants are legally obligations from the issuer directly to the
owner.5 These typical retail banking products are issued by financial institutions only
and are bought predominantly by individual investors. Since short-selling (i.e. writing)
warrants is impossible for individual investors, no margin accounts are required and the
size of the contracts is much smaller than in the options markets. Typically, the owner
of one warrant has the right to buy or sell one-tenth or one-hundredth of the underlying
with this contract (expressed by the conversion ratio), resulting in a median purchase
price of 1.45 Euro per warrant in our sample. Furthermore, transaction costs are close to
those of stocks (median transaction costs per trade are 12.06 Euro), which makes warrants
affordable for individual investors. The buying and selling procedure for the warrants is
similar to that of stocks. Customers of the online broker trade these warrants within the
same technical environment that they are used to from trading stocks. The only additional
requirement is that you sign a form in which you confirm that you are aware of the risks
associated with this kind of securities.
Bank-issued warrants are well-known securities in continental Europe, Australia and in
some markets in Asia. They are less common in the UK and not existent in the US.6
4Sometimes the synonyms covered warrants or third-party warrants are used.
5While in the option market a clearing institution fulfills the obligations of a writer of an option who fails to fulfill his
obligation, there is no such institution in the warrant market. Since all issuers in the warrant market are financial institutions
this default risk should be small and have only minor price impacts.
6For more details on the market for bank-issued warrants, see Glaser and Schmitz (2007).
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By far the largest market for warrants with regard to listed securities (see Figure 1) as
well as turnover exists in Germany. In 2000, the turnover volume of warrants on Ger-
man exchanges was 83.30 billion Euros, which accounted for approximately 1.5% of total
exchange turnover in Germany.7 Another indicator of the importance of warrants in the
German market is the growth of the number of securities. While 100 warrants were listed
in different German market places in 1990, this number rapidly increased to 4,500 at the
beginning of our sample period in January 1997. At the end of our sample period (mid
of April 2001), 23,500 warrants were listed in Germany, and this number grew to nearly
50,000 in December 2006. Why are there so many warrants? Unlike options, warrants are
not written on demand, but are rather issued, similar to bonds, on one particular date in
a quantity defined in advance. Regardless of whether all warrants are sold at the day of
issuance, they can be traded anytime within their lifespan. Furthermore, an issuing insti-
tution does not normally offer only one warrant with one strike price on one underlying
but rather a whole series of warrants on one underlying. The warrants in a series vary with
respect to the type of the warrant (i.e. call or put), the strike price and the maturity date.
Every single security that was designed in such a way is listed as a separate warrant with
a separate ISIN security identifier. As a result, there is a large heterogeneity of securities
in the market for bank-issued warrants.
This high degree of diversity of warrants causes some coordination problems that led
to a strong market maker structure in this market. The market makers, i.e. the issuing
banks, are committed to provide liquidity for their own products, because otherwise, high
costs of finding a contract partner within the group of individual investors could cause a
market breakdown. The issuers provide liquidity by quoting bid and ask prices for their
warrants permanently. The consequence is that individual investors predominantly trade
directly with the market maker. Although the issuers can vary the prices freely, including
7See Voirin (2001), p. 2.
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the possibility to raise prices if investors’ demand is high for these products, they are
restricted in the maximum bid/ask-spread8 and the minimum number of securities they
are willing to buy or sell for the bid or ask price. That means that the issuers also have
to buy back the warrants for the higher price, making it less attractive for the issuers to
quote high prices if the demand is high.9
3 Data Set and Methodology
We derive our sentiment measure from a data set of daily transactions of individual
investors who had accounts at a big German online broker between January 1997 and
April 2001. The data set contains transaction data10 at the individual level for different
groups of securities. While research on individual investor behavior has predominantly
focused on stock trades11, we analyze individual investors transactions in the market for
bank-issued warrants. Information about stock market returns and the warrants traded12
are obtained from different data sources. Returns of the different market indexes are from
Datastream. The German online broker reported the warrant information for roughly half
8Often, the market makers commit to quote spreads not greater than 2% of the absolute value of the warrant.
9Wilkens, Erner, and Ro¨der (2003) find that for similar products which are traded on the same markets as warrants (i.e.
discount certificates and reverse convertibles), prices are too high at the beginning of the lifespan of these products but
convert to their fair values as they approach maturity. Their order-flow hypothesis states that this is due to the fact that at
the beginning of the lifespan the risk that many investors sell back their warrants to the issuer is smaller than at the end
of the lifespan, simply because less products are outstanding.
10The data set contains the account number of the individuals, the date of the transaction, the security identifier (WKN),
the number of securities traded, a purchase or sale indicator, the traded price per security, the transaction costs per trade,
the total transaction volume, and the currency of the security.
11Examples are Gervais and Odean (2001), Odean (1998), and Odean (1999). Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) and
Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Shiraishi, and Watanabe (2002) look at the transactions of individual investors in the market
for mutual funds.
12The information consists of the type (call or put), the underlying, the strike price, the issuer, the maturity date, the
style (European or American), and the conversion ratio of the warrants.
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of the warrants traded. In addition to this data set, we obtained data from the Euwax13,
which provides data from November 1999 onwards, and from the Karlsruher Kapitalmarkt
Datenbank (KKMDB), a capital markets research data base in Germany. The data sets
from various suppliers make it possible to double-check our data. In the category “war-
rants”, the online broker also includes structured retail products like discount certificates
and reverse convertibles that are traded on the same market places as the plain-vanilla
warrants. We excluded those products (3,868) which are identified as non-plain-vanilla
warrants, and these (667) for which the necessary information was not available (e.g. no
strike price, type etc.). In addition, we excluded all warrants with currencies (1,067), in-
terest rates (95), and commodities (77) as underlyings. After matching the information
about the transactions and the attributes of the warrants, we checked whether the re-
ported total volume traded equals the number of warrants traded multiplied by the trade
price. This was not the case in 78 transactions, which we excluded. We also excluded the
415 transactions in warrants that are not quoted in DEM or EUR. The remaining sample
of plain-vanilla bank-issued warrant transactions consists of 90,342 transactions in 6,827
warrants from 1,457 investors14 (see Table 1).
To deepen our understanding of the relationship between investors sentiment and stock
market returns, we divided our data into different sub-samples. We account for the fact
that there exist warrants on stock market indexes as well as single stocks. Therefore
we also derived our sentiment measure for holdings in warrants on stocks and warrants
on indexes separately. Although the majority of warrants in the sample have a stock as
underlying (67.26%), most of the transactions are in index warrants (54.87%) (see Table
13The European Warrant Exchange (Euwax) was the biggest exchange for bank-issued warrants worldwide in the year
2000. More than half of all warrants worldwide are issued in Germany (see Voirin (2001), p. 4) and more than 80% of all
trades in Germany were executed on the Euwax (see Euwax (2001)).
14887 individual investors trade index and stock warrants, 209 trade index warrants while 361 trade stock warrants only.
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2). A justification for this division is that there might well be a difference in trading
patterns with these warrants as one can see from Table 2. While call and put warrants
on indexes are almost evenly often traded by the private investors, the vast majority of
trades in warrants on single stocks are in call warrants. Additionally, indexes could not,
in contrast to other underlyings, be purchased directly on the stock market during our
sample period. Furthermore, potential insider information is not very likely to play a role
in the investment decision in index warrants. These points make warrants on indexes
especially interesting to analyze.
We further divided our sample into the region where the underlying company is from. More
than 93% of all transactions are in warrants on underlyings from Germany (71%) and the
US (22%). The small rest, including warrants on companies from Europe (3%, excluding
Germany), Japan (4%), and other countries (<1%) were not analyzed as single categories.
The third criterion for the division was whether or not the underlying of a warrant was the
main index or was included in the main index in Germany (DAX) or the US (Dow Jones
Industrial Average). For example, warrants directly on the Dow Jones as well as warrants
on General Electric would fall into this category main. As one can see from Table 3,
different indexes often were among the most traded underlyings. Therefore we also looked
at the relationship between sentiment derived from warrants on those indexes and the
respective index as the most direct test one can conduct. Unfortunately, there were less
transactions in warrants on single stocks. To nevertheless be able to calculate a sentiment
measure from transactions in warrants on single stocks, we aggregate all transactions
from warrants on stocks within one of our categories. E.g., the category main German
underlyings (stocks only) includes all transactions in warrants on single companies, that
are included in the DAX. Altogether we end up with 16 different sentiment measures.
Table 4 shows the mean and median number of investors per day in the 16 categories
described above.
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When we look at the sentiment measure from all underlyings we need an appropriate
market return index to which we can relate the sentiment measure. We constructed a
composite index in the following way: We categorized all underlyings based on the index
in which they are included.15 The weighted average of the return of those indexes is our
composite index, while the weights are proportions of transactions in warrants on the
underlyings from the different indexes. The same procedure was used within the “other”
categories. In Germany we used returns of the Nemax and the MDAX and in the US of
the Nasdaq and the S&P 500.
We constructed our sentiment indicator as follows:
Sentt(u) =
Optt(u)− Pesst(u)
Allt(u)
(1)
with Allt(u) = Optt(u) +Neutt(u) + Pesst(u)
and Optt(u) =
Nt∑
i=1
1{Callt(u);NOPutt(u)},it
and Neutt(u) =
Nt∑
i=1
1{(Callt(u);Putt(u))∨(NOCallt(u);NOPutt(u))},it
and Pesst(u) =
Nt∑
i=1
1{NOCallt(u);Putt(u)},it
where Optt(u) (Neutt(u);Pesst(u)) is the number of optimistic (neutral; pessimistic) in-
dividual investors on day t derived from holdings in warrants with u meaning warrants on
underlyings from the 16 categories of underlyings. It is the sum of dummy variables that in-
dicate the N investors who hold warrants on day t. The dummy for optimists is equal to 1 if
the investor i holds at least one call warrant but no put warrant ({Callt(u);NOPutt(u)})
on day t. For neutral investors, the dummy is 1 if he hold calls as well as puts or if he
does not hold any warrants ({(Callt(u);Putt(u))∨ (NOCallt(u);NOPutt(u))}), and it is
15The indexes are the DAX (main German index), the Nemax (German index for technology stocks), the MDAX (German
index for mid-size companies), the Dow Jones Industrial Average (main US index), the Nasdaq 100 (US index for technology
stocks), and the S&P 500 (broad US index; here excluding Dow Jones and Nasdaq 100 stocks).
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1 for pessimists if an investor holds puts but no calls ({NOCallt(u);Putt(u)}). Allt(u) is
the sum of all individuals who hold the underlying u at least once during the sample pe-
riod.16 Sentt(u) is constructed as the difference of optimists minus pessimists normalized
by the number of all traders in the respective period.17 The Sentt(u) values are in the
range from -1 to 1. The indicator is 1 if there are only optimists in the market and -1 if
there are only pessimists. The existence of neutral investors always moves the indicator
closer to 0, ceteris paribus. If the Sentt(u) is 0.5 it could, for example, mean that in that
period 3 times more optimists than pessimists held warrants (no neutral investors), but
it could also be that the same number of optimistic and neutral investors (no pessimists)
had warrants in their portfolio. To make the sentiment indicator comparable with stock
market returns and to avoid autocorrelation problems, we used the first difference of our
indicators (∆Sentt(u)) throughout our analysis.
We use different methods to investigate the relation between individual investor sentiment
and stock market returns. To test whether there is a time structure in the relation, we
estimate vector autoregressive (VAR) models. 10 lags are included in our daily investiga-
tion.18 We estimate the following two regressions simultaneously:
Mat = α1 +
P∑
i=1
β1iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ1iSentt−i(u) + ε1t
∆Sentt(u) = α2 +
P∑
i=1
β2iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ2iSentt−i(u) + ε2t
(2)
where Ma is the return of the stock market for market index a (a²{All; DAX; Ne-
16We do not report results for a volume-weighted sentiment indicator for several reasons discussed in chapter 4.4.
17This measure is similar to the buy-ratio of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and is used as sentiment indicator by
Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2007), but they use buy and sell transactions instead of portfolio holdings. Analogously
to the buy ratio of Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2007), we also calculated a sentiment measure that compares
purchases in calls (instead of stock purchases) and puts (instead of stock sales) for every investor in a specific time period.
The results (unreported here) are the same with regard to the direction of influence, but we obtain less observations per
day, making the results a little less reliable.
18Besides results from prior research, this lag length choice is motivated by the short warrant holding periods of the
investors in our data set. The median holding period is 9 days.
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max+MDAX; Nemax; Dow Jones; Nasdaq+S&P 500; Nasdaq; S&P 500}) and Sent(u) is
our sentiment measure. The βs are the coefficients for the lagged stock returns while the
δs are the coefficients for the influence of the lagged sentiment indicator on the dependent
variable. βs in the first equations and δs in the second equations of the VAR model in
equations (2) are coefficients for autocorrelation. P is the number of lagged periods (P =
10) while t is the respective day.
To get closer insights into whether sentiment influences returns or returns influence sen-
timent we also apply Granger-causality tests.19 The null hypothesis of this test is that all
coefficients of the variables that are not lags of the dependent variable in an equations
(2) type of regression are jointly zero. This would imply that there is no influence on the
dependent variable. Inversely, a variable Granger-causes another if the lags of this variable
help to explain the value of the dependent variable.
Three studies that are methodologically close to ours are those of Wang, Keswani, and
Taylor (2006), Brown and Cliff (2004), and Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2007). The
first two test various proxies for investor sentiment within a vector autoregressive (VAR)
model to investigate the mutual influence between those measures and market variables
like returns and volatility. Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006) find that sentiment, mea-
sured for example by the put-call trading volume and open interest, do not Granger-cause
stock market returns (S&P 100) or stock market volatility. Similar results are provided by
Brown and Cliff (2004). They first test different sentiment measures (e.g. put/call ratio,
closed end fund discount, number of IPOs) and find strong contemporaneous relations
between changes in these proxies and near-term stock market returns. Relying on prin-
cipal component analysis, they elicit their own sentiment indicator to obtain a cleaner
measure of investor sentiment. They test the mutual influence of their indicator and stock
19For details see Granger (1969).
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market returns in a VAR model and show only limited evidence that their sentiment mea-
sure forecasts stock market returns. In contrast, they find strong evidence that returns
influence the level of as well as changes in the sentiment measure. Dorn, Huberman, and
Sengmueller (2007) test the forecasting power of a sentiment variable, the buy ratio20, for
stock returns with a VAR model. They find a positive relation between net trading by
individuals and returns.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Mutual influence of sentiment and stock markets: VAR regression results
In Table 5 we present the full results of one VAR model described in the previous section
as an example. Here we tested the mutual influence of our Composite Index returns and
changes in our sentiment measure that is based on holdings in warrants on all underlyings.
The bold coefficients are those we are interested in, because they show the influence of
returns on sentiment and vice versa. The other coefficients are of minor interest, but one
needs to control for potential autocorrelation. We find a small amount of autocorrelation
in the first lag, as also additional test of (partial-)autocorrelation exhibit.21 Since this
fact holds for all specifications of our model, for the other VAR models we only present
coefficients for the lagged variables, that are not lags of the dependent variable.22
20The buy ratio is similar to the sentiment measures of Kumar and Lee (2006) and Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) but
uses the numbers of investors instead of the volume bought and sold. This makes the measure robust against the behavior
of a few wealthy individuals.
21Additional tests of the all VAR models show there is no autocorrelation in the residuals of the VAR models (see Johansen
(1995)) and that all eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, meaning that the VAR models satisfy stability conditions, which
is also important for the interpretation of impulse-response functions.
22We only report βs and δs for the first 5 lags, although the VAR model is specified with 10 lags, for the reasons of
lucidity and because we found no systematic significance in higher lags.
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From Panel A in Table 6 it can be seen that mutual influence is mainly present in the first
two lagged periods, meaning that there exists an influence only in the very short-run. The
impact from our sentiment measure derived from holdings in warrants on all underlyings
on returns of our composite index is significantly positive with a lag of one period.23
This means that, in aggregate, investors are right with their expectations, at least for
the day following a change in their holdings of warrants. When we look at the influence
of market returns on sentiment, we find that the influence is significantly negative for
lags 1 and 2. Investors tend to open or increase their positions in call (put) warrants if
the composite index declines (increases) the two days before. They engage in negative
feedback trading. These results are in line with the contrarian behavior also found by
other authors.24 The R2s are higher, which indicates that the influence of the returns on
sentiment is stronger than it is the other way around. This effect was found by most of the
other empirical studies on the comovement of sentiment and stock returns as well.25 The
orthogonalized impulse-response functions in Figure 2 and Figure 3 confirm our findings
graphically. An increase in the orthogonalized shock to the returns of the composite index
causes a decrease in the changes in sentiment in the following periods, but these changes
rapidly fall back to a level near zero (see Figure 2). The opposite is true for increases in
the sentiment shocks. The cause a strong decrease of the composite returns in the next
period, before reverting to zero and slightly below (see Figure 3).
When we split our sample into warrants on indexes and warrants on single stocks, we
find a similar picture (see Table 6, Panel B.). For the relation between the returns of
the composite index and the sentiment measure derived from holdings in warrants on
indexes, the results are similar. The R2 for the influence on sentiment is sightly higher. If
23Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2007) and Qui and Welch (2004) find similar results.
24See e.g. Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004).
25See Brown and Cliff (2004), Otoo (1999), Solt and Statman (1988), and Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006).
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holdings in warrants on single stocks are considered the positive one period influence of
sentiment on returns is also existent. But in contrast to former results, the returns of the
composite index does not seem to have influence on private investors sentiment. This fact
could be explained by the attention indexes receive in the media. Important TV-news and
newspapers regularly report changes in the main indexes but rarely price changes in single
company stocks. Much more attention is drawn to index returns and attention increases
trading activity from private investors.26
The results from the VAR models with further partitions of our data into the sub-samples,
described in Section 3, are shown in Table 7. For the category main German underlyings
(see Panel A of Table 7), which includes warrants on the DAX and warrants on different
stocks included in the DAX, the above mentioned results hold as well. There is negative
influence from DAX returns on changes in the sentiment measures for two trading days,
which is stronger, measured by the R2s, than the positive influence of sentiment on returns
the next trading day. We also find a stronger mutual correlation for the sentiment measure
derived from holdings in index warrants, than for single stock warrants and the DAX
returns.
Panel B of Table 7 reveals that a mutual dependency does not exist for warrants on
stocks of smaller, more technology oriented companies. This finding does not coincide
with the conventional wisdom that individual investors have a stronger impact on small
stock returns, at least if company size is a proxy for the ratio of institutional to private
holdings of the shares in that company and thus for the influence of individual investors
on the stock price.
For US underlyings (see Panel C and D of Table 7) we find an even longer lasting negative
influence from stock market returns on investor sentiment of three periods. But by looking
26See Barber and Odean (2007).
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at the coefficients, we find weaker effects than in the category for main German underly-
ings. Not only the coefficients are smaller, but returns also explain less of the variation
of the sentiment. The weakest relation can be found between returns and sentiment mea-
sures based on warrants on single stocks. In contrast to the sentiment based on German
underlyings, the sentiment derived from warrants on US indexes and stocks is not able
to forecast index returns. Since we are looking at private investors at a German discount
broker, this result is not surprising. The movements of the most important indexes in
the world (Dow Jones, S&P 500, Nasdaq) might well influence expectations of German
investors, but it is very unlikely that those investors have an influence on the returns of
these indexes.
4.2 Mutual influence of sentiment and stock markets: Granger-causality tests
To gain further insights into the direction and the strength of the relationship between
individual investor sentiment and market returns we apply Granger-causality tests for the
first two lags of both variables in all specifications.27 Tables 8 and 9 confirm the results
from Section 4.1. When all underlyings are considered, the hypothesis that composite
returns do not have an influence on sentiment can be rejected at lower p-values as the
hypothesis that sentiment has no influence on returns. In addition, the coefficients are
much higher. But in both directions of the influence, the null hypothesis can be rejected
at a 1% significance level, meaning that there exists a mutual influence for one and two
lags.
27We did not optimize the lag length by using information criteria because we wanted to investigate the influence on
the following two trading days and obtain better comparable results across all categories. Different information criteria
(Akaike’s IC, Schwarz’s IC, and Hannan and Quinn IC) show that the modal optimal lag length is two lags for two of the
three information criteria. Only the Hannan and Quinn information criterion shows an optimal lag length of one period for
most of the model specifications.
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The results from the division in warrants on indexes and warrants on single stocks (see
Panel B of Table 8) are also in line with the results stated above. For the index category,
we find similar mutual dependencies between returns and sentiment as for all underlyings,
while there only exists a weak influence of sentiment on returns and non the other way
around, for sentiment measures on a single stock basis. For the subcategories, shown
in Table 9, the VAR results are also confirmed. We find mutual influence in the main
German underlyings category (see Panel A), no influence with other German underlyings
(see Panel B), and influence from returns on sentiment but not the other way round for
all US underlyings (see Panel C and D). The correlations between sentiment from single
stocks and market returns are always lower as when sentiment is measured by holdings of
index warrants.
4.3 Discussion
Taking all results together, we find that there is a mutual influence of sentiment, measured
as holdings of warrants, and stock market returns in the very short-run. Since warrants are
held for a very short time period (median holding period is 9 days for all warrants), it is not
surprising that there only exists influence in the days surrounding a change in the holdings.
An additional result is that the statistical influence of market returns on sentiment is
stronger than vice versa. This is also not surprising, because the main indices receive
a lot of attention and thus may strongly influence beliefs of individual investors about
future stock prices. However, since private investors usually only hold a small portion
of the shares outstanding of listed companies, their influence on prices (in comparison
to institutional investors) might also be small. Theory suggests that the influence of
individuals is greater if they hold relatively more shares in a company. When this amount
is approximated by the size of the companies, we cannot confirm this prediction in our
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data set.
Recent related studies show that past market returns have a strong influence on trading
activity. Glaser and Weber (2005) show that the effect of past market returns on subse-
quent trading volume of individual investors is stronger than that of own past realized
portfolio returns. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) find that “not only does that im-
pact of past market returns on a typical security’s trading activity survive the inclusion
of lagged security returns in the same regression, it appears that the lagged market return
impact is actually larger”28. Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2003) also find in their regressions
that the impact of past market returns on stock purchases is stronger than the effect
of past portfolio returns.29 All these studies have in common that past returns that are
highly visible to investors affect behavior more than returns that are less visible or that
have to be calculated by investors themselves, such as own past realized portfolio returns
or the returns of some individual stocks.
For our sentiment measure we assume that the holding of a put warrant is the revelation
of negative expectation for the underlying. A common opinion is, that people also might
use put warrants to hedge their stock positions in the portfolio and thus it might not be
the expectation of these investors that we measure. But several points show, that hedging
is not the main motive for individual investors to hold put warrants. The first is that
the median holding period for all warrants in our data set is only 9 days and even less
(6 days) for put warrants. Another point is that only 8% of all transactions in warrants
on individual stocks are in put warrants, and for warrants on indexes, where 43% were
28Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006), p. 22.
29See Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2003), Table 2.
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put warrants30, a direct hedge31 was not possible, since private investors were not able to
replicate an index in their portfolio. In addition, by looking at the stock portfolios of the
investors we find that only 87 put purchases (0.66% of all put purchases) were committed
when the investor holds the underlying of the put warrant in his portfolio. In a survey
of a weekly investor magazine and a German discount broker, 4,345 individual investors
were asked for their motives to trade warrants. Only 8% stated that hedging was their
main motive to buy warrants.32 In addition, Bartram and Fehle (2004) compare bid-ask
spreads of similar derivatives on the German warrant and option markets and find that
prices are higher but spreads are smaller in the market for bank-issued warrants. They
conclude that it is more likely that hedgers (i.e. institutional investors ) trade on the
option while speculators (i.e. individuals) trade on the warrant market.33 Altogether, we
argue that hedging only plays a minor role, if any at all, in the market for bank-issued
warrants. And even if investors buy warrants to hedge their long-term investment in the
underlying with a put in the short-run, this means nothing else than that they see an
increased probability of a decline in the price of the underlying in the short-run. This is
a change in their short-term sentiment.
4.4 Robustness
To see whether our results are also valid for sub-samples we conducted some robustness
checks. We divided the sample into different periods and repeated the VAR analysis as
30See Table 2. Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshmann (2007) find similar results for the US option market. They
show that only a small part of non-market-maker trading volume to open an option position is in purchased puts. They
conclude that protective put strategies, often cited in option textbooks, are not an important strategy for private investors.
31“Direct hedge” means holding the underlying and a put on the same underlying.
32See Klotz (2004), p. 16.
33In a follow-up paper Bartram and Fehle (2007) they show that product competition in the two markets reduce the
bid-ask spreads of warrant and options but spreads in the warrant market remain smaller.
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well as the granger causality tests (see Table 10). First, the sample was separated into a
rising and a declining stock market. The bullish market period lasted from the beginning
of our sample until March 7th, 2000, when the DAX reached its high with 8,064.97 points
at that day’s closing bell. The bearish market started the next day and lasted up to
the end of our sample. We additionally subdivided the sample into single years. The
analysis shows that the results were qualitatively similar in all periods with regard to
direction of the influence. The influence of returns on sentiment for all underlyings (see
Panel A in Table 10) is highly significant in every sub-period, but much stronger in the
upward moving market. The influence of sentiment on returns is only significant in the bull
market, meaning that the hypothesis that two lagged variables of sentiment jointly do not
cause composite returns cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. The same
patterns hold for the sentiment measure from index warrants. For the sentiment measure
based on single stock warrants, we find a low causal relationship in both directions in
the bull market and non in the downward moving market. All together, we find stronger
results in upward moving stock markets.
The specification of our sentiment measure, as shown in Equation 1, might be another
factor that is driving our results. We tested our models with two other specifications of
our sentiment measure. First, we changed the definition of the neutral investor. In the
new specification the dummy for the neutral investor becomes one, only if the investor
holds call and put warrants at the same time. Thus we only consider investors that
are invested in warrants on the particular day in time. The second alternative in the
calculation of our measure is, that we defined the difference of optimists and pessimists
as our sentiment indicator. We chose this measure to investigate whether the absolute
number of investors is an important factor in our analysis. The following simple example
should support this argument. While our original measure would have the same value if
there are 2 optimists and 1 pessimist or if there are 200 optimists and 100 pessimists in
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the market, the alternative measure would indicate more positive sentiment in the latter
case. But the alternative would yield the same sentiment if there are 2 and 1 or if there
are 200 and 199 optimists and pessimists. The VAR models with these two alternative
specifications of our sentiment measure show similar results.
Since our sentiment measure is censored between -1 and 1 we also applied a Tobit regres-
sion model of the type
∆Sentt(u) = α+
10∑
i=1
βiM
a
t−i +
10∑
i=1
δiSentt−i(u) + εt (3)
to test whether the censoring of the dependent variable has an effect on the results. The
results from the Tobit regression replicate the results concerning the influence from returns
on sentiment from the VAR models closely.
Another concern about the robustness of our results is that only a few traders could
drive the results in our study. By looking at the maximum trades per account in Table
1, one can see that there is at least one person that traded more than twice per day, on
average. However, in our measure, these intra-day traders could account for only one data
point per day because we are comparing the number of traders and not the volume they
trade. That makes our measure less sensitive to the behavior of a few wealthy traders.34
In addition, investors are classified as neutral if they hold call and put warrants in one
period, which is more likely for investors who trade a lot. Since there are on average
531 people for all warrants classified as positive or negative investors (see Table 4), these
intra-day traders should only play a minor role. To be sure that this is true, we excluded
all those traders who trade on average more than once per day. There were 11 traders in
that category, accounting for 15,009 transactions which we excluded. The results remained
almost unchanged.
34Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2007) specified their buy-ratio in a similar way (number of traders) while others,
Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2006) among them, used a volume buy-ratio.
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We argue that the better measure to infer investor sentiment is to look at the number
of optimists and pessimists in the market, because the way we specified our sentiment
measure is robust against this behavior of a few wealthy individuals.35 Obviously, a test to
get further insights, whether a few wealthy people could change the results is to look at a
volume-weighted sentiment measure. The average trading volume per trade and investor
is positively skewed (median: 1,659; mean: 2,687; STD: 3,659; skewness: 5.76), implying
that there are some traders who trade high volume per trade but many who trade small
volumes. Unfortunately, we are not able to test a volume weighted sentiment measure
analogously to our measure, because we do not have the prices for the warrants on days
where no transaction took place in the warrant, implying that we do not know the market
values of the warrant positions during the holding periods. We addressed this issue in the
two following ways: First, we assumed, that the Euro amount invested at the purchase date
of the warrant is the fixed invested amount throughout the whole holding period. With
this procedure we get qualitatively similar but much less significant results. We secondly
test a volume-weighted sentiment measure that is not based on holdings in warrants but
on the volume differences in purchases of call and put warrants. Since we are considering
only purchases in those securities, we also avoid the problems related to different motives
of selling decisions (see Section 3) but obtain much less observations per trading day. The
results from this analysis for all warrants as underlyings show qualitatively similar results
as those reported for our main VAR models. Both volume-based sentiment measures have
weaknesses that are severe enough to put not too much emphasis on the results. That is
why we do not report the results in detail here.
35See Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2007), p. 10.
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5 Conclusions
Several sentiment indicators have been proposed and investigated over the last 10 to 15
years. Overall, the empirical evidence for an influence of these sentiment indicators on
stock market returns and vice versa is mixed. Some authors find a significant influence,
others do not. In this paper we propose a measure of investor sentiment which is based on
the holdings of bank-issued warrants by individual investors. Our findings contribute to
the ongoing research in the sentiment literature as well as the literature on the behavior
of individuals in financial markets. Additionally, we are (to our best knowledge) the first
who empirically analyze investor behavior in the warrant market.36
We test the mutual relationship of our sentiment measure with stock market returns in a
VAR model and with Granger-causality test. We find that there exists such a relationship,
but only in the very short-run (one to two trading days). The influence of stock market
returns on sentiment is negative and stronger than the influence of sentiment on returns.
Although we used a sentiment measure that ex ante should measure individual investor
sentiment more precisely than other existing measures, we only find a very short-term
influence on stock returns. That makes sentiment a tool of doubtful use for asset manage-
ment in practice, because normally asset managers have much longer investment horizons,
but only investors with a very short investment horizon might use the sentiment measure
outlined in this study for their investment decisions. Nevertheless, our sentiment measure
provides evidence on how investors trade and which factors influence their expectations.
36Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshmann (2007) demonstrate stylized facts of the trading behavior in the US option
market at a more aggregated level. Many of the facts reported can be found in our data as well. In addition we are able to
look at the trading behavior of private investors at an individual portfolio level.
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Table 1: Online Investors’ Warrant Transactions
Observations as well as transactions per account and transactions per warrant are numbers, the other figures are in EUR.
Panel A shows summary statistics of all 103,904 transactions in 8,066 warrants by 1,499 investors. In Panel B, the transaction
data is divided into purchases and sales, while Panel C shows a further division into the four warrant transaction categories.
There are more purchases than sales because investors tend to build positions in a warrant in more transactions with a
smaller number of warrants. The same position of a warrant is sold in fewer transactions with a higher number of warrants
sold at the same time.
obs. mean std.dev. median min. max.
Panel A
all transactions
transactions per account 1,457 62.0 160.9 18 1 2,243
transactions per warrant 6,827 13.2 31.5 4 1 620
transaction costs per transaction 90,342 19.2 21.8 12.2 0 645.3
Panel B
purchases
volume per transaction 49,619 4,635.7 11,303.6 1,885.8 5.4 511,937.1
sales
volume per transaction 40,723 5,549.2 12,777.1 2,136.3 0 295,914.5
Panel C
call purchases
volume per transaction 36,523 4,664.6 11,254.9 1,863.8 5.4 281,813.5
call sales
volume per transaction 29,350 5,767.0 13,095.5 2,190.5 0 237,130.4
put purchases
volume per transaction 13,096 4,555.0 11,438.4 1,943.2 9.0 511,937.1
put sales
volume per transaction 11,373 4,987.0 11,898.2 2,010.9 0 295,914.5
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Table 2: Number and Transactions of Call and Put Warrants
This Table shows the number of warrants traded (Panel A) as well as the transactions in call and put warrants (Panel B)
on all underlyings and separately for warrants on indexes and stocks. The last rows of Panels A and B present percentage
of put warrants traded and percentage of transactions in put warrants, respectively.
all warrants index warrants stock warrants
frequency frequency percent frequency percent
Panel A
number of warrants 6,827 2,235 32.74% 4,592 67.26%
number of calls 5,472 1,269 23.19% 4,203 76.81%
number of puts 1,355 966 71.29% 389 28.71%
% of put warrants 19.85% 43.22% 8.47%
Panel B
transactions 90,342 49,570 54.87% 40,772 45.13%
call transactions 65,873 27,399 41.59% 38,474 58.41%
put transactions 24,469 22,171 90.61% 2,298 9.39%
% of put transactions 27.08% 44.73% 5.64%
Table 3: The Ten Most Traded Underlyings (397 Underlyings Overall)
When counting the most traded underlings, we summed all transactions in different warrants on that underlying. The
column warrants shows how many different warrants of a particular underlying were traded during the observation period.
The column transactions shows how many transactions took place within warrants on that underlying. The underlings in
the table are ranked by the number of transactions.
warrants transactions
underlying frequency percent frequency percent
DAX 30 1,212 17.75 36,734 40.66
S&P 500 173 2.01 3,150 3.47
Commerzbank 238 3.49 2,689 2.98
Dow Jones 30 134 1.96 2,355 2.61
Nasdaq 100 170 2.49 2,282 2.53
SAP 178 2.61 1,804 2.00
Nikkei 225 129 1.89 1,634 1.81
Deutsche Bank 142 2.08 1,612 1.78
Volkswagen 129 1.89 1,491 1.65
Nemax 50 184 2.70 1,415 1.57
total 2,689 39.39 55,166 61.06
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Table 4: Classified Warrant Holders Per Trading Day
Optimists (Pessimists) is the number of investors per trading day, who hold call (put) warrants only. Neutrals are those
investors, who hold call and put warrants at the same time or none of them. Means and median are reported. Investors
shows the total number of investors, who hold a warrant at least once in our observation period. Intraday transactions were
excluded. In the column Underlyings one finds the different categories of the underlyings. They are sorted and combined
by three criteria: Type of the underling (stock market index or stock), main (included or not included in the main market
index), and origin (all, German or US). For small US firms, there exist two indexes (Nasdaq and S&P 500), that were
important underlyings for the traded warrant (see Table 3). We show them separately here. The Composite Index is a
weighted average of the returns of the Indexes DAX, MDAX, Nemax, Dow Jones, Nasdaq, and S&P 500. The weights are
determined by the portion of transactions in warrants with these indexes or stocks from these indexes as underlyings.
Optimists Pessimists Neutrals
Underlying Investors mean median mean median mean median
Panel A
All Underlyings (Indexes and Stocks) 1,455 453.57 441 92.94 90 908.49 911.5
All Underlyings (Composite Index only) 1,093 169.69 161 114.85 108 808.45 804
All Underlyings (Stocks only) 1,245 425.96 404 17.96 18 801.08 821
Panel B
Main German Underlyings (Index and Stocks) 1,294 338.86 353 81.40 76 873.75 862
Main German Underlyings (DAX only) 944 115.06 114 91.51 83 737.43 738
Main German Underlyings (Stocks only) 1,058 295.76 298 13.87 13 748.36 744
Panel C
Other German Underlyings (Indexes and Stocks) 694 117.67 99 6.29 4 570.04 593
Other German Underlyings (Nemax only) 204 11.18 3 5.67 2 187.16 199
Other German Underlyings (Stocks only) 624 111.89 98 2.43 2 509.68 525
Panel D
Main US Underlyings (Index and Stocks) 531 46.70 45 37.81 33 446.49 440
Main US Underlyings (Dow Jones only) 250 9.96 9 17.75 15 222.28 221
Main US Underlyings (Stocks only) 415 39.63 39 23.59 22 351.79 349
Panel E
Other US Underlyings (Indexes and Stocks) 698 128.14 105 15.26 15 554.60 575
Other US Underlyings (Nasdaq only) 195 12.14 3 9.16 7 173.70 185
Other US Underlyings (S&P 500 only) 258 7.12 7 23.42 21 227.46 228
Other US Underlyings (Stocks only) 633 123.19 102 8.57 8 501.24 519
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Table 5: Example for Results of one Vector Autoregressive Model
The reported βs, δs, and p-values are from the VAR model with 10 lags. The dependent variables are the DAX returns and
changes in our sentiment indicator, that is based on holdings in warrants on all underlyings.
Mat = α1 +
P∑
i=1
β1iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ1i∆Sentt−i(u) + ε1t
∆Sentt(u) = α2 +
P∑
i=1
β2iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ2i∆Sentt−i(u) + ε2t
The bold coefficients show the influence of the lagged value of one indicator on the other indicator. The other coefficients
show potential autocorrelation. The Composite Index is a weighted average of the returns of the Indexes DAX, MDAX,
Nemax, Dow Jones, Nasdaq, and S&P 500. The weights are determined by the portion of transactions in warrants with
these indexes or stocks from theses indexes as underlyings. *** (**, *) indicates significance on the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Dependent variable
Composite index return ∆Sent(All)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Composite returns
β•1 0.114 (0.000)*** -0.069 (0.000)***
β•2 -0.035 (0.284) -0.032 (0.000)***
β•3 -0.009 (0.793) -0.009 (0.246)
β•4 0.019 (0.567) 0.004 (0.582)
β•5 -0.010 (0.762) 0.004 (0.660)
β•6 -0.043 (0.190) 0.006 (0.469)
β•7 -0.060 (0.071)* 0.004 (0.603)
β•8 -0.003 (0.925) 0.008 (0.347)
β•9 0.031 (0.355) 0.004 (0.594)
β•10 0.047 (0.140) 0.001 (0.914)
∆Sent(All)
δ•1 0.418 (0.001)*** 0.079 (0.012)**
δ•2 -0.100 (0.435) 0.050 (0.109)
δ•3 -0.109 (0.395) 0.031 (0.327)
δ•4 -0.149 (0.227) 0.041 (0.195)
δ•5 -0.154 (0.232) 0.013 (0.682)
δ•6 0.025 (0.847) -0.027 (0.393)
δ•7 -0.112 (0.383) 0.013 (0.680)
δ•8 -0.014 (0.913) -0.007 (0.834)
δ•9 -0.096 (0.449) 0.008 (0.790)
δ•10 0.037 (0.760) 0.047 (0.114)
Constant 0.001 (0.074)* 0.000 (0.018)**
R2 0.0405 0.1271
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Table 8: Granger-causality Tests
This table reports the χ2-statistics of the Granger-causality test between our sentiment measures and stock market returns.
Column 1 indicates which warrants are used to calculate the sentiment measure. Column 2 shows the direction of the
influence. Columns 3 and 5 report the χ2-statistic and Columns 4 and 6 the respective p-values. The tested hypothesis
is that the indicator named first in the column “Direction of Influence” does not influence the indicator named after the
arrow.
One Lag Two Lags
Underlyings Direction of Influence χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Panel A
All Sent → Composite 12.71 0.0004 10.32 0.0057
Composite → Sent 87.24 0.0000 110.05 0.0000
Panel B
Indexes Sent → Composite 10.35 0.0013 7.04 0.0296
Composite → Sent 114.96 0.0000 134.65 0.0000
Stocks Sent → Composite 4.87 0.0274 5.57 0.0617
Composite → Sent 1.97 0.1603 5.99 0.0499
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Table 9: Granger-causality Tests for the different Categories
This table reports the χ2-statistics of the Granger-causality test between our sentiment measures and stock market returns.
Column 1 indicates which warrants are used to calculate the sentiment measure. Column 2 shows the direction of the
influence. Columns 3 and 5 report the χ2-statistic and Columns 4 and 6 the respective p-values. The tested hypothesis
is that the indicator named first in the column “Direction of Influence” does not influence the indicator named after the
arrow.
One Lag Two Lags
Underlyings Direction of Influence χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Panel A: Main German Underlyings
All Sent → DAX 24.35 0.0000 23.46 0.0000
DAX → Sent 83.33 0.0000 122.93 0.0000
DAX Sent → DAX 22.20 0.0000 19.46 0.0001
DAX → Sent 94.25 0.0000 122.18 0.0000
Stocks Sent → DAX 3.70 0.0545 9.89 0.0071
DAX → Sent 9.09 0.0026 15.78 0.0004
Panel B: Other German Underlyings
All Sent → MDAX, Nemax 1.62 0.2037 1.71 0.4260
MDAX, Nemax → Sent 2.21 0.1370 3.92 0.1408
Nemax Sent → Nemax 1.40 0.2373 7.66 0.0217
Composit → Sent 17.40 0.0000 18.91 0.0001
Stocks Sent → MDAX, Nemax 0.40 0.5289 2.45 0.2944
MDAX, Nemax → Sent 0.17 0.6839 1.50 0.4730
Panel C: Main US Underlyings
All Sent → Dow Jones 0.00 0.9559 0.11 0.9445
Dow Jones → Sent 15.78 0.0001 20.72 0.0000
Dow Jones Sent → Dow Jones 0.01 0.9402 1.94 0.3789
Dow Jones → Sent 13.01 0.0003 14.95 0.0006
Stocks Sent → Dow Jones 0.01 0.9057 1.37 0.5052
Dow Jones → Sent 6.28 0.0122 9.24 0.0099
Panel D: Other US Underlyings
All Sent → Nasdaq, S&P 500 2.01 0.1565 1.27 0.5306
Nasdaq, S&P 500 → Sent 22.18 0.0000 27.86 0.0000
Nasdaq Sent → Nasdaq 0.33 0.5655 0.11 0.9458
Nasdaq → Sent 16.69 0.0000 20.17 0.0000
S&P 500 Sent → S&P 500 0.01 0.9281 6.94 0.0312
S&P 500 → Sent 3.51 0.0610 6.48 0.0391
Stocks Sent → Nasdaq, S&P 500 0.65 0.4199 0.58 0.7474
Nasdaq, S&P 500 → Sent 14.56 0.0001 19.43 0.0001
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Table 10: Granger-causality Tests Over Time
This table reports the χ2-statistics of the Granger-causality test with a lag of two periods between the changes in our
sentiment measures and stock market returns. Column 1 indicates which warrants are used to calculate the sentiment
measure. Column 2 shows the direction of the influence. Under the χ2-statistic one can find the respective p-values. The
results in Columns 3 and 4 are Granger causalities for the rising (“bull”) stock market from 01/02/1997 to 03/07/2000 and
the declining (“bear”) market from 03/08/2000 to 04/12/2001. Columns 5 to 8 report results for single years. Year 2001 is
not considered since data only exists up to the middle of April. The tested hypothesis is that the indicator named first in
the column “Direction of Influence” does not influence the indicator named after the arrow.
Underlyings Direction of Influence Bull Bear 1997 1998 1999 2000
market market
All Sent → Composite 7.88 3.54 3.75 5.73 5.24 1.65
0.0195 0.1707 0.1534 0.0571 0.0727 0.4383
Composite → Sent 102.57 9.18 51.40 31.87 13.40 34.71
0.0000 0.0101 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000
Indexes Sent → Composite 8.44 0.25 6.32 1.81 6.57 2.12
0.0147 0.8829 0.0424 0.4039 0.0374 0.3458
Composite → Sent 126.98 14.40 63.40 50.00 13.80 34.54
0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000
Stocks Sent → Composite 5.03 1.54 1.24 6.37 4.24 1.07
0.0808 0.4633 0.5385 0.0414 0.1203 0.5868
Composite → Sent 6.81 0.51 2.84 0.93 0.71 11.05
0.0333 0.7756 0.2418 0.6275 0.6996 0.0040
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Figure 1: Listed Warrants on Exchanges Worldwide in the Year 2000
Germany 55.7 55,7
Switzerland 1 11,1
France 10.1% 10,1
Italy 9.8% 9,8
Sweden 2.3% 2,3
Netherlands 2 2
Luxembourg 1 1,7
Australia 1.7% 1,7
Belgium 1.6% 1,6
Austria 1.0% 1
Others 3.0% 3
Italy 9.8%
Germany 55.7% 
Netherlands 2.0%
Others 3.0%
Austria 1.0%
Sweden 2.3%
Switzerland 11.1%
France 10.1%
Luxembourg 1.7%
Belgium 1.6% Australia 1.7%
Source: International Warrant Institute (I.W.I.)
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Figure 2: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function: Influence of shocks in the returns of the composite
market index on sentiment
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Figure 3: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function: Influence of shocks in the sentiment indicator on
composite market index returns
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